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Parental Resources and Relative
Risk Aversion in Intra-secondary
Transitions: A Trend Analysis
of Non-standard Educational
Decision Situations in the
Netherlands
Nicole Tieben
The theory of rational educational decisions assumes that parental resources as well
as status maintenance motives are relevant for educational decisions. A large body of
previous research examines these mechanisms for standard educational decisions at
the conventional transition points. There is reason to assume, however, that the same
decision parameters affect non-standard educational transitions as well. Secondary
education in the Netherlands is divided into four hierarchical tracks and students are
allocated to one of these tracks at the age of 12 years. In the Dutch educational system
upward and downward intra-secondary transitions between the different tracks are
possible during secondary education. The analyses of this article show that upward
mobility to a large extent is driven by status maintenance motives but that downward
track mobility is not influenced by parental background when initial track placement is
taken into account. While effects of parental resources decrease, the status maintenance
motive does not change in relevance over time.
Introduction
In the Netherlands, children are allocated to a number
of different school types after primary education at the
age of 12 years. The school types (tracks) differ in
standards and prestige. Besides, each of these tracks
results in specific eligibility for subsequent education.
Secondary track placement therefore is crucial for the
later educational career as it determines the future
options and restrictions to a large extent. The alloca-
tion to the initial track to some extent is based on
meritocratic principles as previous performance is the
most influential factor in the track placement of
students. Despite the aim to realise meritocratic
allocation, tracked systems are criticized for producing
or enhancing social inequality because children from
advantaged socioeconomic backgrounds have higher
chances to end up in the higher and more favourable
tracks (Diederen, 1981; Dronkers, 1983; Vrooman and
Dronkers, 1986; Bronneman-Helmers et al., 2002).
These children receive beneficial early socialization in
their family of origin and profit from this advantage
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already in primary education. Through the early assess-
ment of future potential and division into performance
levels these differences accumulate during secondary
education. The Dutch educational system therefore
maintains some flexibility and permeability between
tracks so that students have the possibility to change to
a higher or lower track during secondary education if
an erratic initial track placement or the unexpected
development of the performance makes this necessary.
From the perspective of social stratification the issue
of track mobility becomes particularly relevant when
corrections of the initial track occur in a socially
selective way and either serve to secure advantages of
privileged groups or to compensate for disadvantages.
The opportunity to correct initial track placement can
be used by children from disadvantaged backgrounds
who are more prone to be placed in tracks below their
actual potential (Kropman and Collaris, 1974). In this
case, track mobility during secondary education can
compensate at least partly for inequalities in initial
track placement. On the other hand, children from
more advantaged backgrounds, who are placed in
lower tracks, can profit from family resources which
facilitate the transition to a higher track. In this case,
track mobility even amplifies the inequality that arises
in the first transition from primary to secondary
education. We argue, however, that it is not primarily
the family resources that play a decisive role in the
choice to change tracks but rather the motive of status
maintenance. When the maintenance of the parental
status is threatened by allocation to an insufficient
initial track, a student is more likely to change to a
higher track and less likely to change to a lower track.
Considering this, the absolute social position should
be less important for intra-secondary transitions than
the parental position relative to the expected future
position of their children. In this article, we therefore
aim to approach the following research questions: To
what extent are intra-secondary transitions socially
selective? To what extent does the motive of status
maintenance explain the background effects on intra-
secondary transitions?
Furthermore, we examine if policy measures can
influence the frequency and selectivity of intra-
secondary transitions. In 1968, the Dutch government
established an educational reform (mammoth law)
with the aim to make secondary education more
efficient, flexible, and meritocratic. The initial track
placement and permeability between tracks has been
improved. However, research on the effectiveness of
the reforms in terms of frequency and selectivity of
intra-secondary transition has not been carried out in
the Netherlands before. Therefore, we propose the
following research questions: To what extent did the
reform increase the number of intra-secondary transi-
tions? To what extent did the reform reduce social
selectivity of intra-secondary transitions?
Theoretical Background
General Theories of Educational Inequality
In the Netherlands, the track placement in secondary
education is based to a large extent on the perfor-
mance in primary school. This ensures that children
are allocated to relatively homogenous learning groups
and that they are neither overburdened nor get bored
in class. But this meritocratic principle of allocation
is also criticized for producing inequality. Children
from higher educated backgrounds profit from a broad
range of resources and parental support already in
their pre-school socialization, so that they enter
primary school with a head start compared to their
classmates from less advantaged backgrounds. Cultural
reproduction theory (Bourdieu, 1966, 1973) explains
these differences in educational outcome with the fact
that cultural and educational resources vary with social
background. Parents with a high socioeconomic status
transfer the knowledge, tastes, and preferences to their
children in order to reproduce and secure the families’
social status. Bourdieu assigns a central role to the
distinctive and exclusionary character to the ‘legitimate
high status signals’, habitus in Bourdieus’ terminology
that are valued and sanctioned in education and create
a cultural gap between social classes (Lamont and
Lareau, 1988). De Graaf (1989) points out that
parental cultural resources indeed have a direct and
positive effect on the cognitive competence of the child
which results in a higher performance level. This is
especially due to the stimulation of language skills
through parental reading habits, while other dimen-
sions of cultural capital do not have a positive effect.
However, more recent approaches point out that
the perspective of cultural reproduction might be too
limited to explain background specific educational
outcome. Empirical research (Bosker et al., 1989;
Dronkers, 1993) shows that even when measured per-
formance is controlled for, family background effects on
educational attainment are observed. Boudon (1974)
assigns an equally important role to the parameters
influencing educational decisions net of performance.
The parameters influencing the educational outcome
are divided into ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ effects.
Primary effects are those factors which directly influence
the performance level—and these may actually be inter-
preted in the sense of cultural reproduction theory.
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Secondary effects on the other hand, are responsible for
the educational decisions within the individual oppor-
tunity structure. In other words, within the options
that are available on basis of the performance, actual
decisions are the result of a class-specific assessment of
costs and risks (cf. Erikson and Jonsson, 1996; Breen
and Goldthorpe, 1997; Jackson et al., 2007). In recent
empirical research (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997; Need
and Jong, 2001; Davies et al., 2002; van de Werfhorst and
Andersen, 2005; Breen and Yaish, 2006; Stocke´, 2007)
special attention is paid to the aspect of relative risk
aversion. These works assume that it is the desire for
intergenerational status maintenance that produces dif-
ferential educational decisions. The core idea is that
parents want their children to obtain an educational level
which is sufficient to reach their own status. As children
from lower-status parents can easily reach this aim by
obtaining low or intermediate education, children from
higher-status parents have to obtain higher educational
levels in order to avoid status demotion.
To summarize, all theoretical approaches outlined in
the above section would predict a higher initial track
placement for children from advantaged socioeco-
nomic backgrounds in the Netherlands. First, these
children are more likely to show the required perfor-
mance in primary school to be eligible to enter the
higher tracks. Second, on top of the better perfor-
mance they have a stronger tendency to choose the
more ambitious tracks—given the same opportunity as
their less advantaged classmates. However, the initial
track placement may be erratic or undesired. Track
allocation is to a certain extent based on a teacher
assessment and recommendation at the end of primary
school. The results of an aptitude test (CITO) deliver
objective criteria for the allocation. Besides, ‘soft’
factors, like the motivation or behaviour of the
students and their home situation may also influence
the teachers’ recommendation (Luyten and Bosker,
2004; Driessen, 2005). In certain cases overambitious
parents might interfere and negotiate a more desirable
recommendation than originally planned. To a limited
extent it is possible for parents to defy the rating of the
teacher and place their child in a higher or lower than
the recommended track. At the same time the teacher
has the difficult task of predicting the future potential
for performance development. As a result, the track
choice, even when it does follow the teacher’s recom-
mendation, might turn out to be suboptimal in terms
of performance-track matching, either because of an
inaccurate assessment of the students’ potential or
because of an unexpected development of the perfor-
mance level. Furthermore, initial track allocation can
be optimal in terms of performance-track matching,
but undesirable in terms of relative risk aversion.
Parents may strive to optimize their children’s chances
for status maintenance by trying to place them in a
sufficient track, but given the reality of their actual
ability, this desire can be frustrated by insufficient
performance of the child. In these cases students have
the opportunity to correct initial track placement by
changing to a higher or lower track.
Basically the same decision patterns that occur in the
scheduled transition between primary and secondary
education should occur in these intra-secondary
transitions as well. Parental resources and the motive
of status maintenance can contribute to the decision to
either make a transition to a higher or to a lower track
than the one chosen initially. The main difference
between the scheduled transitions and intra-secondary
transitions is that after allocation to secondary tracks,
the students are already sorted by their performance
level and, as far as this is correlated to parental
resources, by family background. The next section of
this article gives a brief overview of the Dutch
educational system, followed by a description of the
special decision situations given for intra-secondary
transitions.
The Dutch Educational System
At the age of 12 years children are allocated to one of
four different tracks.1 The tracks differ in standards
and in the qualifications which can be obtained with a
successful termination of the course. Pre-vocational
education (LBO) takes 4 years and ideally prepares a
student for entry into intermediate vocational educa-
tion (MBO) where specific vocational skills are taught.
Junior general education (MAVO) also takes 4 years
and is meant to prepare for intermediate vocational
education, but the curriculum of this track is more
theoretical and less practically oriented than the lower
vocational track. Pre-vocational education and junior
general education ideally should lead into a subsequent
intermediate vocational training at intermediate voca-
tional schools (MBO). The third track is senior general
secondary education (HAVO) which takes 5 years and
prepares students for entry into lower tier tertiary
education at a vocational college (HBO). The most
prestigious pre-university track (VWO) gives eligibility
for university entry and takes 6 years.
Graduates of pre-vocational and junior general
education who enter the labour market without any
additional vocational qualifications face severe disad-
vantages and risks of discontinuous employment,
unemployment, and low wages (Traag et al., 2005;
Wolbers, 2008). Diploma from HAVO and VWO do
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qualify for direct entry into the labour market, but
ideally should be followed by tertiary education either
at a university or a vocational college.
Socially Selective Intra-secondary
Transitions
Three different types of intra-secondary transitions can
be distinguished—upgrades, downgrades, and supple-
ment diploma.
Downgrades are mainly an option when the current
educational track is too demanding and the student
is at risk to fail the term. The main advantage of
a downgrade is that it disburdens the student and
increases his/her chance to complete the term and to
leave education with a diploma. The disadvantage is
that a lower graduation has to be accepted than the
one initially aspired. A common strategy to avoid a
downgrade is grade retention but this bears the
drawback of an additional year in secondary education,
going along with the additional direct costs and
opportunity costs. It seems logical to expect that
especially the children from lower socioeconomic
backgrounds are most likely to experience a downgrade
regarding their cultural and material resources at
home. But at the same time these children also are
less likely to make overambitious initial track choices
in the first place, so to the contrary we have to expect
the higher-background children to be the under-
performers that are at risk to downgrade. Besides, a
‘bottom effect’ prevents downgrades for all children
that are allocated to the lowest track. This should also
work selectively on lower background students. It is
therefore likely that the effects of parental background
on downgrades as such are rather weak when the
initial track placement is taken into account
(Hypothesis 1).
The main difference between upgrades and supple-
ment diploma is that an upgrade takes place before
the first secondary diploma while a supplement takes
place after the first diploma. Both are upward intra-
secondary transitions and have the advantage of
leading to a higher than the initially expected diploma.
The disadvantages are higher direct and indirect costs
and a higher risk of failure. Compared with an
upgrade, supplement diplomas are a ‘safe’ option as
the lower track has been completed and a first gradua-
tion is obtained already. If the student fails the
supplement, he/she has no risk of finishing without
any diploma. Upgrading, however, is more efficient
than a supplement. While an upgrade is a direct route
to a higher diploma, a student has to take an extra year
in education for a supplement. Instead of directly
making a transition from the last year of the lower
track into the next level, the student has to enter the
class level below in order to compensate the faster
learning progress in the higher track. This decreases
the risk of failure but increases the opportunity costs.
Considering the fact that children from higher
socioeconomic backgrounds profit from the cultural
resources of their parents, they should be more likely
to make upward intra-secondary transitions. On the
other hand, they achieve higher performance scores
already in primary school. They are more likely to be
allocated to higher tracks in the initial track placement
and the incentives for upgrades in these groups remain
doubtful. Besides, ceiling effects prevent upgrades and
supplements from the highest track. This works
selectively on the advantaged students who are more
likely to be allocated to these tracks. Effects of parental
background on the risk of making upward intra-
secondary transitions therefore should be rather weak
if existing at all, when initial track is taken into
account (Hypothesis 2).
The above-derived hypotheses show that no clear
effects of parental background can be predicted for
intra-secondary transitions because of the previous
selection based on performance level and social back-
ground. We argued above, however, that this selection
might not be perfect in terms of the desired status
maintenance. Especially when a meritocratic track
allocation is realized, teachers may decide to give a
recommendation for a lower than the aspired track
which is not sufficient for status maintenance. We
suggest that especially in these cases an incentive for an
upward intra-secondary transition is given. The motive
of status maintenance implies that the decision to
make intra-secondary transitions is not influenced by
the education of the parents as such but rather by the
relation of the parental status and the status that can
be reached by the child with a diploma from the initial
track. Children that have entered an initial track that is
insufficient for status maintenance therefore should be
more likely to make upward intra-secondary transi-
tions than children who are allocated to a sufficient
track (Hypothesis 3).
Trends
In 1986, the Dutch government implemented far-
reaching educational reforms in order to flexibilize the
educational systems and improve meritocracy. These
reforms probably had an effect on the frequency and
selectivity of intra-secondary transitions. The main aim
was to improve the initial track allocation by introduc-
ing the CITO test and teacher recommendation.
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The permeability between tracks should be improved
by the pooling of different school types to school
communities, which comprise different tracks under
one roof and administration. This facilitates intra-
secondary transitions by reducing transaction costs like
the administrative effort or simply the fact that the
student has to leave his school and classmates and has
to get accomplished to new surroundings after an
intra-secondary transition. Besides, a comprehensive
bridge year was introduced to postpone the definite
allocation by 1 year and make the placement less
erratic. Regarding intra-secondary transitions, this
reform has the following consequences: first, the need
for intra-secondary transitions for reasons of perfor-
mance mismatch possibly has been reduced, while the
transitions as such were facilitated. On the other hand,
the intra-secondary transitions for reasons of status-
track mismatch might have increased, because initial
track allocation has to be justified by actual perfor-
mance after the reform. It is therefore hardly possible
to make predictions regarding the incidence rate of
intra-secondary transitions. Besides, the general educa-
tional expansion also leads to an increase of partici-
pation in the higher tracks and a decrease of
participation in lower tracks, so that ceiling and
bottom effects would increase the number of down-
grades and decrease the number of upgrades and
supplements. Nevertheless, the reform has removed
barriers for making intra-secondary transitions. This
might have stimulated upward intra-secondary transi-
tions of children from less advantaged backgrounds
who tend to make cautious initial track choices. Effects
of absolute parental background on the risk of making
upward intra-secondary transitions therefore should
decrease after the introduction of mammoth law
(Hypothesis 4a). On the other hand, there is no
reason to assume that the motive of relative risk
aversion is affected by changes in institutional barriers.
Effects of relative parental background on the risk of
making upward intra-secondary transitions therefore
should remain stable after the introduction of mam-
moth law (Hypothesis 4b).
Data and Variables
For the empirical test we used the Family Survey of the
Dutch Population (Ultee and Ganzeboom 1992; de
Graaf, de Graaf, Kraaykamp and Ultee, 2002, 2003,
2004). This is a four-wave (1992, 1998, 2000, 2003)
repeated cross-sectional retrospective life-course study
on a representative sample of the Dutch population. The
dataset contains detailed retrospective information
about the educational careers of each of the approxi-
mately 7500 respondents as well as socioeconomic situ-
ation in the family of origin. We used only respondents
who entered secondary education between their 10th
and 14th year of age and who reported a track placement
in an institution of secondary education.
The dependent variable is a four-category variable
indicating the type of intra-secondary transition with
the categories ‘no intra-secondary transition’, ‘down-
grade’, ‘upgrade’, and ‘supplement’. The distribution of
this variable can be obtained from the bottom row of
Table 1.
For bivariate and multivariate analyses, we used the
following independent variables: Sex (male¼ 0;
female¼ 1). The year of the transition to secondary
education was clustered into 5-year periods, except for
the first and last cohorts; these are broader due to
sample size. The distribution of this variable can be
found in the last column of Table 2. Initial track is
classified in four categories. In the Netherlands,
especially in the pre-reform period,2 a multitude of
different school types exists in secondary education
and therefore several types, which are comparable,
were clustered into four main types (LBO, MAVO,
HAVO, VWO) in order to maintain lucidity and
parsimony of the analyses.3 Figure 1 shows the
distribution of this variable.
The parental status was operationalized with educa-
tion of the parents. The dataset contains information
of the final educational attainment of both parents.
The educational level of the highest educated parent is
the basis for a three category variable of parental
education. Parents with only primary education or
lower secondary education are coded as low-educated
(¼1), parents with higher secondary or vocational
training are coded as medium educated (¼2), and
parents with tertiary and post-tertiary education are
coded as highly educated (¼3). For testing the
hypothesis of relative risk aversion, we constructed
the ‘relative education’ of the parents. This is a dummy
indicating whether the child is allocated to a track
from which it is not possible to reach the parental
educational level without making an upward intra-
secondary transition. The underlying assumption is
that children have to obtain at least the same
educational level as their own parents to reach the
same status in the future. This assumption in fact is
problematic regarding the educational expansion in the
Netherlands and the resulting diploma inflation. If a
devaluation of educational credentials has to be taken
into account, the same educational level would not be
sufficient for status maintenance. However, this also
implies that parents have to anticipate and evaluate the
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future performance of their children when the child is
12 years old. It may be argued that parents at this
point only have a limited view on the returns of
educational credentials and rather take their own
educational attainment as a benchmark. Van de
Werfhorst and Andersen (2005) discuss the effects of
diploma inflation on educational decisions and come
to the conclusion that especially the later transitions
are influenced by decreasing returns but that decisions




Figure 1 displays the distribution of initial track place-
ment when the students first entered secondary educa-
tion. We find a strong growth of HAVO participation
and a decrease in LBO participation. For MAVO and
VWO we rather observe some trendless fluctuations
than a clear trend. We may conclude from this develop-
ment that the population at risk to make a downgrade
increases over time while the population at risk for
upward transitions remains more or less stable. Table 1
shows the percentage of intra-secondary transitions per
school type. The chances of LBO and VWO students to
make any kind of intra-secondary transitions are lower
than those of students who entered the middle tracks
(which probably is a consequence of the fact that they
can move only in one direction), but VWO-students
have a high risk to downgrade (11 per cent). The
upgrade rates are very low irrespective of track, only 1
per cent of the whole population make an upgrade.
However, the supplements are more popular, a total
of 8 per cent uses this pathway to obtain a higher
graduation than aimed at in the initial track. The
supplement rate is highest in MAVO, which is not
surprising, because obtaining a HAVO supplement
gives eligibility to enter tertiary education in a
vocational college. The additional qualification proba-
bly is a considerable payoff. In general, MAVO
students are most mobile.
Table 2 shows the development of the first intra-
secondary transition across cohorts. We find a clear
increase in total mobility from the 1966–1970 cohorts
on, which mainly can be attributed to the increase in
supplements. Upgrade rates drop from a quite high
level in the first two cohorts and fluctuate in all
subsequent cohorts without a clear trend. We also
observe a slight increase in downgrade rates from the
1966–1970 cohorts on. This indicates that the intro-
duction of the mammoth law indeed triggered an
increase in intra-secondary transitions. Therefore, we
further scrutinize this with the help of multivariate
analyses.
Multivariate Analyses
In the above analyses we can use a total of 6,337
respondents and we found that 14.6 per cent of these
students make at least one intra-secondary transition.
With traditional bivariate methods we can only
examine one transition per respondent but our data
reveal that a considerable share of students makes
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Figure 1 Distribution of initial track allocation by cohort
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more than one transition in different sequences. Of all
respondents, 837 (13 per cent) make only one tran-
sition during their educational career, 83 (1.3 per cent)
make two transitions and 7 (0.1 per cent) even make
three transitions. In order to take all transitions into
account instead of only the first, we developed a
person-transition file, which contains one spell for
each respondent and additional spells for the second
and third transition. Based on this dataset, we obtain a
total of 6,434 spells. About 5410 (84.1 per cent) of
these make no intra-secondary transition, 382 (5.9 per
cent) downgrade, 76 (1.2 per cent) upgrade and 566
(8.8 per cent) take a supplement. All following analyses
will be based on these data.
In Table 3 we present the results of four hierarchical
multinomial logit models. The dependent variable
contains the three types of intra-secondary transitions
and the category ‘no track-mobility’ as reference. The
coefficient for sex shows that being male has a negative
effect on the chance to upgrade (relative to girls), while
there are no gender differences for downgrades and
supplements. This pattern is consistent throughout
all models.
Having highly educated parents improves the chances
of making any kind of intra-secondary transition.
However, effects for children of middle-educated
parents on upgrading are not significant. Introducing
the relative education of the parents results in a negative
effect for downgrades. Both coefficients for upward
transitions are positive. It is especially remarkable that
the effect for the absolute education of the parents
disappears under control of the relative education,
while the coefficient for relative education itself is very
high, which corroborates our hypotheses that upgrading
indeed is driven by status maintenance motives to a
large extent. The effect for supplements is weaker but
we also observe strong control effects on the absolute
education.
Model 3 controls for initial track placement. As in a
multinomial regression we have to insert all initial
tracks simultaneously, we have the problem of perfect
predictions for upgrades/supplements from VWO and
downgrades from LBO. We therefore constrained these
Table 2 Intra-secondary transition by birth-cohort
Period entry
secondary education
No change Downgrade Upgrade Supplement Total
N Per cent N Per cent N Per cent N Per cent N
1927–1950 528 92.5 24 4.2 14 2.5 5 0.9 571
1951–1955 395 90.8 17 3.9 8 1.8 15 3.5 435
1956–1960 669 91.8 34 4.7 6 0.8 20 2.7 729
1961–1965 656 88.7 39 5.3 7 1.0 38 5.1 740
1966–1970 699 81.1 51 5.9 8 0.9 104 12.1 862
1971–1975 807 81.4 61 6.2 10 1.0 113 11.4 991
1976–1980 724 82.1 69 7.8 3 0.3 86 9.8 882
1981–1990 803 82.4 58 6.0 8 0.8 106 10.9 975
1991–1998 129 84.9 12 7.9 1 0.7 10 6.6 152
Total 5410 85.4 365 5.8 65 1.0 497 7.8 6337
Table 1 Intra-secondary transitions by initial track allocation
No change Downgrade Upgrade Supplement Total
N Per cent N Per cent N Per cent N Per cent N
LBO 2054 95.7 0 0 14 0.7 78 3.63 2146
MAVO 1851 75.7 188 7.69 47 1.9. 360 14.7 2446
HAVO 585 82.3 63 8.86 4 0.6 59 8.3 711
VWO 920 89 114 11 0 0 0 0 1034
Total 5410 85.4 365 5.8 65 1.0 497 7.8 6337
PARENTAL RESOURCES AND RELATIVE RISK AVERSION 7
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transitions to be zero. We observe that initial track
placement completely explains the effects of absolute
and relative education of the parents on downgrading,
the effects collapse to insignificance under control of
initial track. We observe some control effects on the
upward changes but the main conclusions from Model
2 regarding upgrades and supplements remain largely
untouched. We observe that students who were placed
in HAVO or VWO have a higher chance to downgrade
than students of MAVO, while MAVO students have
the highest chances of being upwardly mobile either by
upgrading or by taking a supplement diploma.
Effects of Reforms
In Model 4 we added cohort dummies for 5-year
periods4 in order to test trends. As we have exact
information on the timing of each transition, we chose
to use the year of transition. This has the advantage
that we can avoid a lag for supplements which can be
taken 3 years after entry to secondary education at
minimum, while upgrade and downgrade are possible
in the first year. Doing so, we can exactly trace the
effects of the reform in 1968. For the same reason we
set the 1969–1975 cohort as reference category. We
find weak evidence for an increase of the downgrade
rate after 1968. However, the coefficients clearly change
from negative in the previous cohorts to positive in the
subsequent cohorts. For upgrades we do not find any
evidence for changes over time, except for one
sporadic outlier in the 1951–1955 cohort5. However,
supplements clearly and massively increase after 1968,
although we have to acknowledge that we also observe
a continuous increase in the pre-reform cohorts. In
order to verify the effects of the mammoth law on the
selectivity of intra-secondary transitions, we ran two
models replacing the cohort-dummies by a reform
dummy, which is one for all transitions that took place
after introduction of the reform. The coefficients of
these models are displayed in Table 4. The general
pattern of all effects presented in the previous models
remains more or less unchanged. Therefore we only
report effects of the dummies and its interactions.
As observed in the more detailed models we find a
clear increase of the frequency of downgrades and
supplements in the post-reform period but not for
upgrades (Model 5). A detailed diagnosis of the
frequency distribution (as summarized in Table 2)
shows, however, that we observe an increase that can
be directly attributed to the mammoth law only for
supplements. We find a sudden and clear increase of
the percentage of students who take a supplement
from 1968 on. For downgrades, the effect of the reform
dummy can be explained with a more or less unbroken
linear increase of the downgrade frequency and for
upgrades we find a curvilinear pattern6. To test
whether the reform also had an effect on the effects
of parental education, we introduced interactions with
the indicators for parental education. In Model 5 we
do not find a change of effects of absolute or relative
education of the parents for downgrades and upgrades,
which again corroborates our finding from the
previous section that absolute education of the parents
is irrelevant for these intra-secondary transitions.
However, we do find a strong decrease of effects of
absolute education for supplements over time.
Conclusions
Our analyses show that children from advantaged
backgrounds are more prone to make any type of
intra-secondary transition, but that these effects dis-
appear when initial track placement and relative
education are taken into account. Children with
highly educated parents are more likely to be placed
in higher educational tracks and this increases their
risk to make downgrades. In the case of downgrading
neither the parental resources (absolute education) nor
the relative risk aversion have an influence on the
downgrade propensity. Effects of parental background
are entirely explained by initial track placement.
Comparing the effects of parental background on
upgrades and downgrades reveals that absolute educa-
tion of the parents does not add to the chances of
making an upgrade while having parents with upper
secondary or vocational education increases the chances
for making a supplement. This indicates that supple-
ments also are taken by children of higher-educated
parents who are not threatened by status demotion.
Most interesting is the fact that effects of middle
education of the parents decrease from a very high
level in the pre-reform period to insignificance in the
post-reform period. This indicates that supplements
especially for children of lower-educated parents became
a popular strategy to obtain a higher graduation than
the diploma obtained in the initial track. According to
our expectation, the effects of relative education of the
parents do not change over time. There is no reason
to expect that the impact of the motive of status
maintenance on the decision to make intra-secondary
transitions decreases across time. Furthermore, policy
measures also are unlikely to have an effect.
To summarize, we can say that downgrading is not
associated with parental background but rather with
the initial track placement. We suggest that
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downgrades generally are more driven by insufficient
performance than by background features of the
students. Upgrades are rare and apparently restricted
to the special group of students who were placed in an
initial track that is not sufficient to reach the parental
status. Status maintenance pressure for these students
seems to be so high that they do not hesitate to take
the risk and effort to upgrade. Considering supple-
ments we found that these became an increasingly
popular path to obtain a higher graduation than the
first diploma. The supplement from MAVO is espe-
cially popular. We assume that a supplement which
results in a HAVO diploma is especially attractive
because the direct and indirect costs of obtaining such
a supplement are low and the payoff of having a
HAVO diploma is high as HAVO-graduates are eligible
to enter lower tier tertiary education. Besides, the
repetition year seems to offer extra security instead of
being discouraging. Children of low-educated parents
can profit from this opportunity and compensate
the disadvantage they had in previous transitions.
However, for supplements status maintenance seems to
be a strong impetus as well.
One of the aims of the reform was to create a more
flexible educational system and to improve the oppor-
tunity to change to a higher track during secondary
education. Lower class children should especially profit
from the improved permeability and compensate dis-
advantages they had in previous transitions. Another
aim of the reforms was to improve initial track
placement so it is inappropriate to evaluate the success
of the reform purely by the effect it had on the
frequency of intra-secondary transitions. Apparently,
the reform did not have a pronounced effect on the
frequency of upgrades but supplements became more
popular after the reform and the frequency of down-
grades even decreased. This might indicate that the
reform was successful in improving the initial track
Table 4 Results of multinomial logit regression of intra-secondary transitions (logit coefficients),
trend-interactions included in models
M5 M6
DN UP SUP DN UP SUP
Intercept 3.31 3.88 3.44 3.32 4.06 4.06
Sex (8) 0.09 0.60 0.14 0.09 0.61 0.13
Educ. parents low (ref.)
Educ. parents middle 0.03 0.16 0.27 0.01 0.18 1.33
Educ. parents high 0.15 0.01 0.38 0.04 0.41 0.34
Educ. parents same or lower than students’ (ref.)
Educ. parents higher 0.15 1.35 1.11 0.05 1.30 1.08
initial/current track
LBO 0 0.75 1.20 0 0.75 1.19
MAVO (ref.)
HAVO 0.85 0.42 0.44 0.85 0.41 0.43
VWO 1.18 0.00 0 1.18 0 0
Year of transition
Before 1968 (ref.)
After 1968 0.54 0.25 1.83 0.56 0.19 2.55
Interactions with reform
Educ. parents middle 0.06 0.76 1.23
Educ. parents high 0.17 0.89 0.84
Educ. parents higher 0.26 0.14 0.02
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.09
Log pseudolikelihood 3386.92 3377.39
Wald 2 (df) 515.83 (21) 457.75 (30)
N (Events) 379 76 565 379 76 565
N (Episodes) 6359 6359
N (Persons) 6262 6262
***P50.001 **P50.01 *P50.05 P40.1; DN, downgrade; UP, upgrade; SUP, supplement; reference category¼ no intra-secondary transition.
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placement because early corrections occur less often.
The increase in supplements is plausible because a
supplement is a safe way to obtain a higher graduation.
Besides, the supplement perhaps is not a correction of
the earlier track placement but rather an additional
qualification. Labour market requirements possibly
even increased the demand for supplements in the
last decades. The supplement also became more attrac-
tive for the lower social classes and the effects of
absolute parental education decreased after the reform.
However, all intra-secondary transitions enhance the
advantage of the higher social classes instead of helping
to compensate the disadvantage. The effect of the
reform is that the accumulation of advantages is
reduced at least regarding the supplements, but not
reversed.
We acknowledge that the main driving force for
intra-secondary transitions is probably the perfor-
mance of the child which to a large extent sets the
latitude for changing tracks. We gained valuable
insight into the role of family background but
nevertheless the pseudo-R2 suggests that they do not
offer an exhaustive explanation of the mechanisms
behind intra-secondary transitions. In future research,
it would be desirable to integrate performance mea-
sures to scrutinize on the interplay between perfor-
mance, recommendation, track-placement, family
background, and intra-secondary transitions.
Notes
1. From 1968 on, the government introduced
so-called bridge classes which pooled two or
more of these tracks for 1 year. The aim of this
policy was to postpone the final decision for one
of these tracks and reduce erratic placement. For
this work, data were used which do not contain
information on the allocation to a bridge class,
the initial track placement thus is a retrospective
reconstruction of the final placement.
2. A recent reform (1999) also has pooled LBO and
MAVO to a new type VMBO (intermediate pre-
vocational education.
3. LBO (‘lower vocational education’)¼LBO;
huishoudsschool (‘school for home economics’)¼
LBO; VBO (‘pre-vocational education’)¼LBO;
MAVO (‘intermediate general education’)¼
MAVO; ULO (‘extended lower education’)¼
MAVO; MULO (‘more extended lower
education’)¼MAVO; HAVO (‘higher general
education’)¼HAVO; MMS (‘intermediate school
for girls’)¼HAVO; VWO (‘pre-university
education’)¼VWO; HBS (‘higher school for
citizens’)¼VWO; Atheneum (‘gymnasium for
modern languages’)¼VWO; Gymnasium (‘gram-
mar school’)¼VWO.
4. Except for the first period, which is 10 years, due
to the small number of observations in the early
cohorts.
5. Note that N is small in this category and that this
result may be due to weak statistical power.
6. This has been verified with a further multivariate
analysis, using a regression discontinuity model on
a linear trend (cf., Shadish et al., 2002). Results
are available upon request.
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